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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case   
Gregory Joseph Nelson appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing his seventh petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 In affirming Nelson’s 1995 convictions and sentences for first-degree 
kidnapping and lewd conduct on direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
described the underlying facts of Nelson’s conviction as follows: 
According to the evidence presented at trial, appellant 
Gregory J. Nelson went to the home of K.M., a ten-year-old girl who 
lived in his neighborhood.  Nelson knew that K.M.’s parents would 
not be home that morning because her father was in Alaska and 
her mother was at work. When Nelson arrived, he offered to pay 
K.M. twenty dollars if she would come and clean the travel trailer in 
which he lived.  After an initial refusal, K.M. ultimately agreed, and 
Nelson drove her to his trailer. Shortly after they arrived and K.M. 
began cleaning, Nelson told K.M. that he was a doctor and that he 
wanted her to remove her shirt.  When she refused, he knocked her 
down on the bed, held a pillow over her face until she agreed to 
remove her clothing, and then sexually molested her.  After the 
incident, Nelson drove K.M. back to her house.  Once there, K.M. 
immediately told her two brothers that Nelson had hurt her, and 
they took her to the house of a neighbor.  The neighbor telephoned 
K.M.’s mother, who arrived a few minutes later as did police and 
paramedics.  K.M. was then taken to a hospital where she was 
examined by a physician. 
 
State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 213, 953 P.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 A jury found Nelson guilty of first-degree kidnapping and lewd conduct with 
a minor.  See id.  The district court denied Nelson’s motion for a new trial, and 
imposed concurrent fixed life sentences.  See id.  Nelson raised nine issues on 
2 
direct appeal.  Id. at 213-222, 953 P.2d at 653-662.  The Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed Nelson’s conviction and sentences.  Id.   
Over the next several years, Nelson filed four unsuccessful petitions for 
post-conviction relief, asserting dozens of various claims.  See Nelson v. State, 
2003 Unpublished Opinion No. 846, Docket No. 27266 (Idaho App., September 
22, 2003); Nelson v. State, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 524, Docket 
No. 30771 (Idaho App., June 28, 2005). 
In 2011, Nelson filed a fifth1 petition for post-conviction relief, requesting 
DNA testing of K.M.’s underwear and materials in the rape kit.  See Nelson v. 
State, 157 Idaho 847, 850, 340 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Ct. App. 2015).  Pursuant to a 
stipulation between the parties, Y-STR DNA testing was performed.  See id.  The 
testing results indicated that Nelson and his paternal relatives could not be 
excluded as the source of the male DNA profile obtained from the relevant 
evidence.  See id.  Shortly after the testing was completed, the state answered 
Nelson’s post-conviction petition and moved for its dismissal based upon the 
results of the testing.  See id.  In response, Nelson requested that a different type 
of DNA test, STR, be conducted.  See id.  The district court denied the request 
and summarily dismissed Nelson’s petition.  See id.  While this summary 
dismissal of Nelson’s fifth post-conviction petition was pending appeal, Nelson 
filed a sixth post-conviction petition, in which he alleged that certain evidence 
                                                        
1 While the Idaho Court of Appeals described this prior petition as Nelson’s fourth 
post-conviction petition, the state calculates Nelson’s petitions in the same 
manner that the district court has.  (See R., p.1454 n.1.)  Consistent with that 
calculation, the state refers to the post-conviction petition at issue in this appeal 
as Nelson’s seventh post-conviction petition.  
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was tampered with.  See id.  The district court summarily dismissed this petition.  
See id.   
In a consolidated appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s summary dismissal of both petitions.  Id. at 850-857, 340 P.3d at 1166-
1173.  The Court held that, in light of the results of the previous testing and other 
circumstances of the case, Nelson failed to demonstrate that the additional DNA 
testing had the potential to provide new, noncumulative evidence that would 
show that it was more probable than not that Nelson was innocent.  Id. at 850-
853, 340 P.3d at 1166-1169.  The Court also held that Nelson failed to 
demonstrate he was entitled to the appointment of counsel on his tampering 
claim because he did not present the possibility of a valid claim.  Id. at 854-857, 
340 P.3d at 1170-1173.     
In February 2015, twenty years after his convictions, Nelson filed a 
seventh petition for post-conviction relief, and numerous exhibits, affidavits and 
declarations in support.  (See, e.g., R., pp.7-981, 1001-1004, 1014-1016, 1045-
1047, 1059-1063, 1075-1110, 1114-1129, 1227-1255, 1268-1283, 1296-1312, 
1328-1436, 1438-1452.2)  Nelson appears to have raised two claims in the 
                                                        
2 Citations to page numbers of the clerk’s record refer to the original clerk’s 
record that was compiled before the Idaho Supreme Court granted Nelson’s 
motion to augment and delete portions of the record.  (See 12/13/16 Order.)  The 




petition.3  (R., pp.7-32.)  First, he argued again that he was entitled to STR DNA 
testing on K.M.’s underwear and materials in the rape kit.  (Id.)  This time, 
Nelson’s focus was on attempting to obtain K.M.’s DNA profile.  (Id.)  Nelson 
sought to compare K.M.’s DNA profile with testing on underwear that he alleges 
he was wearing at the time of his contact with K.M.  (Id.)  Nelson contended that 
the absence of K.M.’s DNA on this underwear would prove his innocence.  (Id.)  
This underwear, asserted Nelson, had been in the possession of the Ada County 
Public Defender’s Office since 1995, and then was sent to a lab on his behalf in 
2014, where testing was conducted.  (R., pp.7-32, 1331-1337; see also 8/20/15 
Tr., p.77, Ls.10-18; Confidential Exhibit, pp.3-7.)   
Second, Nelson appears to contend that the state committed a Brady4 
violation by failing to disclose allegedly impeaching evidence about Frederic 
Whitehurst, a former FBI agent who testified as a witness at Nelson’s jury trial, 
and who later became the subject of a U.S. Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) 
report regarding accusations Whitehurst made against FBI lab practices. 
(R., pp.7-32; see also 8/20/15 Tr., p.78, L.1 – p.81, L.11 (Nelson describing his 
Whitehurst claim during a hearing).)  In support of this claim, Nelson submitted 
several hundred pages of reports from the OIG, all generated after Nelson’s 1995 
trial, discussing (and occasionally criticizing), Whitehurst’s allegations with 
respect to numerous high-profile investigations, including the World Trade Center 
                                                        
3 While the claims in Nelson’s petition are somewhat difficult to decipher, the state 
adopts the manner in which the state and district court construed Nelson’s 
claims.  (See R., pp.1032-1038, 1470-1474.)  Nelson has not challenged this 
characterization of his claims on appeal.  (See Appellant’s brief.) 
 
4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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bombings, the attempted assassination of former U.S. president George H.W. 
Bush in Kuwait, and the O.J. Simpson case.  (R., pp.237-274, 303-809, 811-956.)  
The supporting materials also included a letter indicating that the Ada County 
Prosecutor’s Office mailed at least a portion of one of these reports to the Ada 
County Public Defender’s Office in December 1997.  (R., p.237.)  
The district court denied Nelson’s motions for appointment of counsel to 
represent him on the petition.  (R., pp.1130-1132, 1469-1470.)  The district court 
also denied Nelson’s various requests to conduct discovery.  (6/25/15 Tr., p.26, 
L.24 – p.27, L.22; p.35, L.23 – p.37, L.12.)  After a hearing, the district court 
granted the state’s motion to summarily dismiss the petition.  (R., pp.1468-1475.)  
The court concluded that Nelson failed to demonstrate he was entitled to 
additional DNA testing because the requested testing did not have the potential 
to show that it was more probable than not that Nelson was innocent. 
(R., p.1474.)  The court also concluded that Nelson failed to demonstrate why his 
Brady claim involving Frederic Whitehurst could not have been raised in one of 
Nelson’s previous post-conviction petitions, or upon direct appeal, and was 
therefore waived pursuant to applicable law.  (Id.)  The court also concluded that 
the claim was untimely.  (Id.)   
Nelson filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction.  (R., 
pp.1464-1467, 1476-1477.)  The district court and Idaho Supreme Court denied 
Nelson’s motions for appointment of counsel to represent him on the appeal.  
(See 6/10/16 “Motion for an order directing the trial court to appoint the SAPD on 
appeal” and supporting memorandum; 6/21/16 Order.)  Nelson proceeds pro se. 
6 
ISSUES 
 Nelson states the issues on appeal as: 
 
A. Did the district Court abuse its discretion in in [sic] granting 
the State’s motion to quash Nelson’s subpoena duces 
tecum? 
 
B. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Nelson’s 
motion to compel compliance with the subpoena duces 
tecum? 
 
C. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Nelson’s 
motion for court-ordered discovery, Rules 57(b), I.C.R., 
26(b)(4), I.R.C.P.? 
 
D. Did the district court abuse its discretion in failing to rule on 
Nelson’s intervening motion for leave of court to conduct 
discovery that was based on Nelson’s forensic expert’s 
affidavit? 
 
E. Did the district court err in granting the state’s motion for 
summary dismissal? 
 
F. Did the district court abused [sic] its discretion by failing to 
rule on Nelson’s motion for leave of court to file an amended 
petition? 
 
G.  Did the district court err by not allowing Nelson to file his 
bifurcated petition without leave of the court? 
 
H. Did the district court err in denying nelson’s motions for 
appointment of counsel? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5 (capitalization modified).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Nelson failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition? 
 
2. Has Nelson failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion with respect to any of Nelson’s discovery requests? 
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3. Has Nelson failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion with respect to Nelson’s attempts to seek leave to file amended 
post-conviction petitions? 
 
4. Has Nelson failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 






Nelson Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Seventh Post-Conviction Petition 
 
A. Introduction   
Nelson contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
seventh post-conviction petition.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.40-54.)  A review of the 
record reveals that Nelson has failed to demonstrate error because: (1) Nelson 
failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to the additional DNA testing which had 
already been denied by the district court in a previous post-conviction 
proceeding; and (2) his Brady claim involving Frederic Whitehurst was waived 
because Nelson failed to demonstrate sufficient reason why it was not raised in a 
previous post-conviction petition or upon direct appeal.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate 
court will review the entire record to determine if there is a genuine issue of 
material fact that, if resolved in petitioner’s favor, would require that relief be 
granted.  Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 
1992).  The court freely reviews the district court’s application of the law.  Id. 
 
C. Nelson Was Not Entitled To Additional DNA Testing 
 
Under I.C. § 19–4902, a petitioner may file a post-conviction petition 
seeking DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial that 
resulted in his conviction if the evidence was not subjected to the requested DNA 
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testing because the technology was not available at the time of the trial. 
I.C. § 19–4902(b).  The petitioner must present a prima facie claim that identity 
was at issue in the trial and that the evidence was subject to a sufficient chain of 
custody.  I.C. § 19–4902(c).  The district court must then allow the testing under 
reasonable conditions if the district court determines that: “(1) The result of the 
testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent; and 
(2) The testing method requested would likely produce admissible results under 
the Idaho rules of evidence.”  I.C. § 19–4902(e).  In the event testing is 
conducted, the court shall “order the appropriate relief” if the results demonstrate, 
in light of all admissible evidence, that the petitioner is not the person who 
committed the offense.   I.C. § 19–4902(f). 
In his seventh post-conviction Nelson argued, as he did in his fifth post-
conviction, that he was entitled to STR DNA testing on K.M.’s underwear and 
materials in the rape kit.  (R., pp.7-32.)  This time, rather than attempt to seek 
testing on the ground that it might exclude him as a contributor to DNA found on 
materials related to K.M., Nelson sought to obtain K.M.’s  DNA profile in order to 
compare it with testing already completed on underwear that Nelson alleges he 
was wearing at the time of his contact with K.M.  (Id.)  Nelson contended that the 
absence of K.M.’s DNA on this underwear, which he had already arranged testing 
on, would prove his innocence.  (Id.)  
As the district court properly concluded (R., p.1474), the absence of K.M.’s 
DNA on Nelson’s underwear would not prove his innocence.  Nelson did not 
10 
present evidence indicating that the sexual conduct for which he was convicted 
would have necessarily resulted in the transfer of identifiable DNA materials from 
K.M. to this underwear.  Even the affidavit of forensic scientist George J. Schiro, 
Jr., submitted by Nelson in support of his petition, is conditional as to this point.  
(R., p.1080 (“If Mr. Nelson had intimate penile contact with someone, then never 
showered, cleaned up, or bathed, and put the underwear on within 24 hours of 
that contact, then it is likely that DNA from the other individual would be 
transferred to the underwear.”).)  As the district court noted (R., p.1474), even if 
K.M.’s DNA was not found on this underwear, there would still be credibility 
determinations for the fact-finder regarding whether Nelson bathed in the interim 
between the time of the sexual misconduct and the time of arrest several hours 
later.  The court noted that this was significant because, at the trial, the jury 
already made adverse credibility determinations about Nelson, who testified that 
he did not engage in sexual activity with K.M.  (See id.)    
On appeal, Nelson appears to take issue with the district court’s 
consideration of credibility determinations made by the jury at the trial.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.48-50.)  However, contrary to Nelson’s apparent contention, 
the district court made no new credibility determinations in denying Nelson’s DNA 
request.  Instead, the district court properly considered the evidence presented at 
trial in making its determination that the absence of K.M.’s DNA on Nelson’s 
underwear would not prove his innocence.  Idaho Code § 19-4902 does not 
preclude a district court from considering the entire context of a petitioner’s 
request, including existing evidence of guilt or other circumstances of the trial, in 
11 
determining whether new requested testing has the potential to prove 
innocence.5 
Nelson is not entitled to engage in a fishing expedition involving multiple 
DNA tests.  Further, in light of this previous testing which demonstrated some 
degree of certainty that he was the perpetrator, and the other evidence of guilt 
presented at the jury trial, Nelson cannot show even a reasonable probability that 
new DNA testing would produce an exculpatory result.  Nelson thus cannot meet 
the materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902. 
Nelson has failed to show that any additional DNA testing had the 
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that 
it is more probable than not that he is innocent of the crimes for which he was 
                                                        
5 Indeed, I.C. § 19-4902 did not even require the district court to assume, for the 
purposes of its analysis, that K.M.’s DNA would not be found on Nelson’s 
underwear.  This distinguishes I.C. § 19-4902 from the corresponding post-
conviction DNA testing statutes of several other jurisdictions which do expressly 
require the district court to assume exculpatory results when analyzing whether a 
petitioner has made the required materiality showing.  E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
1-413(1)(a) (a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a) 
“Favorable results of the DNA testing will demonstrate the petitioner’s actual 
innocence”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-102kk(b)(1) (a court must order DNA testing if 
petitioner shows “[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not 
have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained 
through DNA testing”); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1(c)(3)(ii) (petitioner must 
present a prima facie case demonstrating that “DNA testing of the specific 
evidence, assuming exculpatory results, would establish” actual innocence or 
support a lesser sentence in a capital case); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035(7)(1) 
(petitioner must show a “reasonable probability exists that the movant would not 
have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through the 
requested DNA testing” (emphasis added)); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-7-8(4); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 422.285(5)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.0918(7)(a).  If the Idaho 
legislature wished to remove the judicial determination of the likelihood of 




convicted.  He has therefore failed to show he is entitled to additional DNA 
testing or that the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.  
 
D. Nelson Was Not Entitled To Relief On His Brady Claim Regarding Frederic 
Whitehurst 
 
A successive petition for post-conviction relief is generally not permissible.  
I.C. § 19-4908 (claims not raised in initial post-conviction proceedings generally 
waived).  Only in cases where the petitioner can show “sufficient reason” why 
claims were “inadequately presented in the original case” may he have the 
opportunity to re-litigate them.  Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 
978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted); see also I.C. § 19-4908.  An analysis of 
whether “sufficient reason” exists to file a successive petition includes an analysis 
of whether the petition was filed within a “reasonable time” after the petitioner’s 
discovery of the factual basis for the claim.  Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 
904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007).  “In determining what a reasonable time is for 
filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply consider it on a case-by-case 
basis, as has been done in capital cases.”  Id. at 905, 174 P.3d at 875.  
Additionally, a post-conviction petition is not a substitute for a direct 
appeal, and any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was 
not, is forfeited.  I.C. § 19-4901(b). 
In this case, Nelson’s post-conviction Brady claim centers around former 
FBI agent Frederic Whitehurst.  (R., pp.7-32; see also 8/20/15 Tr., p.78, L.1 – 
p.81, L.11 (Nelson describing his Whitehurst claim during a hearing).)  Whitehurst 
testified at Nelson’s 1995 jury trial.  (R., pp.160-172.)  Prior to the trial, the Idaho 
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State Laboratory submitted evidence to Whitehurst for testing.  (R., pp.112, 161.)  
In summary, Whitehurst testified that baby oil he found on both K.M.’s underwear 
and an anal swab from the rape kit originated from the same “batch” of oil as the 
contents of a container of baby oil seized from Nelson’s residence.  (R., pp.82-
87, 142-143, 167-169, 225.)  This testing was consistent with testimony and 
statements of K.M. that Nelson had rubbed baby oil that he possessed in his 
residence on her.  (R., pp.78-79, 94-95.)        
According to the OIG report, Whitehurst, in the 1990s, raised concerns 
about FBI laboratory policies and conduct of certain colleagues.  (R., pp.271-
274.)  In 1997, the OIG issued a several-hundred page report analyzing these 
allegations. (R., pp.303-809.)  The OIG concluded that, while Whitehurst 
“justifiably raised concerns” in some respects, some of his allegations were 
unsupported by facts, and that Whitehurst utilized bad judgment in the manner in 
which he raised some of his allegations.  (R., pp.271-274.)  According to a letter 
submitted by Nelson in support of his petition, the Ada County Prosecutor’s 
Office obtained and submitted at least a portion of the 1997 report, including 
some of the OIG’s conclusions regarding Whitehurst, to the Ada County Public 
Defender’s Office in December 1997.  (R., pp.237-274.) 
In his post-conviction petition, Nelson appears to argue that the state 
committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose Whitehurst’s allegations and the 
14 
OIG’s analysis of these allegations.6  In support of this allegation, Nelson 
obtained and submitted the entire 1997 report, as well as a 2014 OIG follow-up 
report which assessed the 1996 report and associated review of FBI lab policies.  
(R., pp.303-809, 811-956.)  None of these supporting materials reference 
Whitehurst’s role in Nelson’s jury trial, or appear to make conclusions regarding 
Nelson’s own lab work.        
The district court granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal of 
Nelson’s Whitehurst Brady claim.  (R., p.1474.)  The court concluded that Nelson 
failed to demonstrate that the claim could not have been raised in one of 
Nelson’s previous petitions, or upon direct appeal, and was therefore waived 
pursuant to I.C. §§ 19-4901(b) and 19-4908, and untimely.  (Id.)  The court also 
recognized that a post-conviction petitioner cannot base a successive post-
conviction claim upon evidence that is merely impeaching.  (Id. (citing Fields v. 
State, 151 Idaho 18, 25-26, 253 P.3d 692, 699-700 (2011).) 
The district court’s determination is supported by a review of the record.  
Nelson has failed to demonstrate sufficient reason why this claim could not have 
been raised in a previous post-conviction petition.  Gus Cahill, the Ada County 
Public Defender who represented Nelson at the jury trial (see R., p.47), was sent 
a partial copy of the 1997 OIG report in December of that year (R., p.237).   
While Cahill did not receive the entire report, the portion he received discussed 
                                                        
6 The Whitehurst reports have caught the attention of other defendants.   In 2016, 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a federal habeas petitioner 
alleging misconduct of an FBI agent who had been the subject of allegations 
made by Whitehurst.  In re Bolin, 811 F.3d 403, 409-411 (11th Cir. 2016); see also 
Moody v. Thomas, 89 F.Supp.3d 1167, 1204-1205, 1216-1217, 1246-1255 
(N.D. Ala. 2015) (review pending).  
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many of Whitehurst’s allegations, and contained at least some of the OIG’s 
conclusions regarding those allegations.  (R., pp.237-274.)  
Additionally, while the law cited by the district court for its conclusion that a 
post-conviction petitioner “cannot base a successive claim for post[-]conviction 
relief upon evidence that is merely impeaching” (R., p.1474), applies specifically 
to Idaho capital cases, this conclusion is related to the similar principle that a 
Brady violation cannot be predicated on evidence discovered only after the 
criminal proceedings are accomplished.  A “criminal defendant proved guilty after 
a fair trial does not have the same liberty interests as a free man,” and “nothing in 
[the Supreme Court’s] precedents suggested that this disclosure obligation 
continued after the defendant was convicted and the case was closed.”  District 
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69 
(2009).  Because a convicted person has a lesser due process expectation than 
an accused defendant, “Brady is the wrong framework” to analyze a claim of a 
right to disclosure of evidence in post-conviction proceedings.  Id.  In this case, 
the 1997 and 2014 OIG reports submitted by Nelson were both generated after 
his 1995 jury trial.  Therefore, Nelson’s Brady claim regarding these reports fails 
as a matter of law. 
Finally, as the state argued in its motion for summary dismissal (R., 
pp.1037-1038), Nelson also failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated he 
was entitled to relief on his Brady claim.  Nothing in the OIG reports cast doubt 
upon the validity of the testimony Whitehurst gave at Nelson’s jury trial, or the 
testing he conducted in advance of the trial.  Further, the conclusions of the OIG 
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regarding the validity of Whitehurst’s allegations also did not have any apparent 
impeachment value – even if they had been known at the time of the trial.   
Nelson has failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to post-conviction 
relief or that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his seventh post-
conviction petition.  This Court should therefore affirm the determination of the 
district court.  
 
II. 
Nelson Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
With Respect To Any Of Nelson’s Discovery Requests 
 
A. Introduction 
Nelson contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
and/or failing to rule on various discovery requests made in the course of the 
post-conviction proceeding.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.33-40.)  A review of the record 
demonstrates that Nelson has failed to establish an abuse of the district court’s 
discretion.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter left to the 
sound discretion of the district court. I.C.R. 57(b); Raudebaugh v. State, 
135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001) (citing Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 
311, 319, 912 P.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1996)). On review, the appellate court must 
determine whether the district court “acted within the boundaries of its discretion, 
consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices, and whether 
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the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Lafferty, 
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1984).  
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion With Respect To 
Nelson’s Various Discovery Requests 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) provides that, “the provisions for discovery in 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to the [post-conviction relief] 
proceedings unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court.”  Idaho 
Criminal Rule 57(f) limits discovery to prevent the state and the court from being 
inundated with discovery requests by applicants who are either unaware of 
proper methods or are simply on fishing expeditions.  The Idaho courts have 
recognized that traditional discovery methods, normally applicable to civil cases, 
might be inappropriate in collateral proceedings.  Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45, 
50, 577 P.2d 24, 29 (1978); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d 
749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999).  In Raudebaugh, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, 
“Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant’s substantial rights, the 
district court is not required to order discovery.”  Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 605, 
21 P.3d at 927.  
Further, “[i]n order to be granted discovery, a post-conviction applicant 
must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is requested and why 
discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her application.”  State v. 
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003), (citing 
Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402-03, 973 P.2d at 754-755).  Nelson has failed to 
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demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion with respect to any of his 
discovery requests.   
1. Subpoena Duces Tecum  
  Nelson served a subpoena duces tecum on the Idaho State Police seeking 
the DNA profile for K.M.  (R., pp.985-986.)  Therefore, through this subpoena 
duces tecum, Nelson essentially sought the same evidence that was the subject 
of his post-conviction request for additional DNA testing.  He later filed a motion 
to compel compliance with the subpoena.  (R., pp.1020-1029.)  The state moved 
to quash the subpoena.  (R., pp.987-991.)  In support of its motion, the state 
argued that DNA records and profiles are specifically exempted from disclosure 
by I.C. § 9-340C(17) and I.C. § 19-5514, and that none of the statutes cited by 
Nelson gave him the authority to compel it to disclose a victim’s DNA profile.  (Id.)  
At a subsequent hearing on the motion, the state also noted that such disclosure 
was contrary to a memorandum of understanding it has with the federal 
government with regards to the use of the CODIS DNA database.  (6/25/15 Tr., 
p.25, L.17 – p.26, L.3; p.29, L.6 – p.30, L.12.)    
  Nelson has failed to show that the district court erred.   First, as the district 
court properly recognized (6/25/15 Tr., p.23, Ls.7-20), Nelson had no authority to 
seek discovery through the subpoena duces tecum without the prior authorization 
of the district court in the first place.  I.C.R. 57(b).  Therefore, the district court 
essentially construed Nelson’s motion to compel compliance with the subpoena 
as a post-conviction discovery request.  (6/25/15 Tr., p.35, L.23 – p.37, L.12.)      
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  Following argument from the parties, the district court granted the state’s 
motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum and denied Nelson’s motion to 
compel compliance.  (Id.)  The district court first recognized that, while DNA 
profiles are confidential, there are mechanisms by which such records could be 
disclosed to a party in a civil case but kept confidential.  (6/25/15 Tr., p.35, L.23 – 
p.36, L.9.)  However, in this case, the court denied the discovery request after 
properly recognizing its discretionary authority and concluding that the 
information requested by Nelson could not lead to exculpatory evidence.  
(6/25/15 Tr., p.35, L.23 – p.37, L.12.)  The district court’s reasoning was similar to 
that which was the basis of its subsequent summary dismissal of Nelson’s 
request for additional DNA testing.  (Id; R., pp.1472-1474.)  For all of the reasons 
set forth above with respect to that issue, Nelson has failed to demonstrate that 
the requested discovery was necessary to protect his substantial rights, and thus 
has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 
2. 5/17/15 Discovery Request 
In his 5/17/15 motion, Nelson appeared to request discovery related to 
Cindy Hall, the state’s lab analyst.7  (R., p.1072-1074; see also 6/25/15 Tr., p.22, 
Ls.11-21 (Nelson and the court discussing the request).)  The request was made 
in response to the state’s notice to the court that it intended to call Hall as a 
witness at future hearings on the state’s pending motions in the case, including 
its motion for summary dismissal of Nelson’s post-conviction petition. 
                                                        
7 Nelson also redundantly requested K.M.'s DNA profile, as he did in the context 




(R., pp.1072-1074, 1057-1058; 6/25/15 Tr., p.22, Ls.11-21.)  The state objected 
to Nelson’s request.  (R., pp.1138-1139.)  A hearing on this and other motions 
filed by Nelson was conducted on June 25, 2015.  (See generally 6/25/15 Tr.)   
The district court cited the applicable law, recognized its discretionary 
authority, and properly denied Nelson’s discovery request.  (6/25/15 Tr., p.26, 
L.24 – p.27, L.22.)  As the court concluded, Nelson failed to demonstrate how 
production of documents related to Hall’s potential testimony at subsequent 
hearings would lead to exculpatory evidence or was otherwise necessary to 
protect Nelson’s substantial rights.  (Id.)  Nelson has therefore failed to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.  Further, even assuming 
error, any such error was harmless pursuant to I.R.C.P. 618 because Hall did not 
ultimately testify at any of the subsequent hearings.  (See generally 8/16/15 Tr.; 
8/20/15 Tr.; 12/17/15 Tr.)   
3. 12/9/15 Motion For Leave To Conduct Discovery 
 
In December 2015, approximately 10 months after he filed his seventh 
post-conviction petition, Nelson filed a request for leave to conduct discovery.  
(R., pp.1429-1436.)  Nelson sought identification and test results of an item 
referenced in a law enforcement property invoice as having been booked into the 
state lab.  (Id.; see also Appellant’s brief, pp.37-40.)  On appeal, Nelson contends 
that the district court erred in failing to rule on this motion.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.37-40.) 
                                                        
8 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides that “[a]t every stage of the 
proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any 
party’s substantial rights.” 
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Nelson’s argument fails because the district court’s subsequent order 
granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal of Nelson’s post-conviction 
petition constituted an implicit denial of Nelson’s motion for leave to conduct 
discovery.  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “where a district court fails to 
rule on a motion, we presume the district court denied the motion.”  State v. 
Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 61-62, 343 P.3d 497, 503-504 (2015) (citing Sales v. 
Peabody, 157 Idaho 195, 202, 335 P.3d 40, 47 (2014); United States v. Claxton, 
766 F.3d 280, 291 (3rd Cir. 2014) (noting that several federal circuit courts of 
appeals treat a district court’s failure to rule on an outstanding motion as an 
implicit denial of that motion); United States v. Jasso, 634 F.3d 305, 307 n. 2 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (treating a district court’s failure to rule on a motion for reconsideration 
as an implicit denial based on the entry of a final judgment); Norman v. Apache 
Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The denial of a motion by the district 
court, although not formally expressed, may be implied by the entry of a final 
judgment or of an order inconsistent with the granting of the relief sought by the 
motion.”)). 
In this case, the district court’s implicit denial of this motion is especially 
apparent considering the motion was specifically referenced by the court both in 
its dismissal order (R., p.1469), and during the hearing on the state’s motion for 
summary dismissal (12/17/15 Tr., p.105, L.25 – p.107, L.8).  Therefore, Nelson 
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has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in failing to rule on this 
request.9 
Further, to the extent this Court construes this claim as also contending 
that the district court erred in implicitly denying the motion for leave to conduct 
discovery, the state asserts that Nelson has failed to demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion because he has failed to show that the court’s granting of this request 
was necessary to protect his substantial rights 
 
III. 
Nelson Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
With Respect To Nelson’s Attempts To Seek Leave To File Amended Post-
Conviction Petitions 
 
A. Introduction   
Nelson contends that the district court erred by denying and/or failing to 
rule on his attempts to seek leave to file amended post-conviction petitions.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.55-56.)  A review of the record reveals that Nelson has 
failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Post-conviction cases are generally governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000); thus, a 
                                                        
9 In the alternative, it does not appear that Nelson filed a notice of hearing with 
respect to this request.  “Under the local rules of the Fourth Judicial District, 
parties are required to schedule motion hearings with the clerk of the presiding 
judge and ‘only those civil matters which have been scheduled for hearing by the 
clerks as provided by this rule and noticed for hearing pursuant to Rules 5(a) and 
7(b), I.R.C.P., will be heard by the court.’”  Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 




motion to amend a post-conviction petition is governed by I.R.C.P. 15(a).  “The 
denial of a plaintiff’s motion to amend a complaint to add another cause of action 
is governed by an abuse of discretion standard of review.”  Commercial Ventures, 
Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d 955, 959 
(2008) (quoting Est. of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623 
(2004)). 
 
C. Nelson Has Failed To Demonstrate He Is Entitled To Relief With Respect 
To His Unsuccessful Attempts To File Amended Post-Conviction Petitions 
 
 While amendments to pleadings should be liberally granted when justice 
so requires, a trial court has broad discretion to deny a request where there is 
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice 
to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc.”  Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).  Thus, for 
example, a trial court properly refuses permission to amend a civil complaint 
when the record contains no allegations that, if proven, would entitle the party to 
the relief claimed.  Bissett v. State, 111 Idaho 865, 869, 727 P.2d 1293, 1297 
(Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted).     
Although “amendments should be liberally granted,” the failure to grant a 
request to amend, or the failure to explicitly “recognize” the policy favoring liberal 
amendments, does not ipso facto establish an abuse of discretion.  If that were 
the case, there would be no discretion at all in relation to requests to amend, 
which is clearly contrary to existing law.  Commercial Ventures, Inc., 145 Idaho at 
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212, 177 P.3d at 959.  Reasons for which leave to amend may be denied include 
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 
failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to 
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of 
amendment.  McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 237, 61 P.3d 585, 594 (2002).    
1. “Bifurcated” Petition 
 Pursuant to the version of I.R.C.P. 15(a) that was in effect at the time 
Nelson filed his post-conviction petition, a post-conviction petitioner was entitled 
to amend his petition once, as a matter of course, at any time before a 
responsive pleading was served.  I.R.C.P. 15(a) (2015); see also Rhino Metals, 
Inc. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319, 321, 193 P.3d 866, 867 (2008) (applying I.R.C.P. 
15(a) and concluding that the district court erred by assuming that Craft’s motion 
to dismiss was a “pleading” and by disallowing Rhino’s amended complaint filed 
without leave of court). 
 In July 2015, Nelson filed a motion for leave to file a “bifurcated” amended 
post-conviction petition and a proposed amended petition.  (R., pp.1218-1219; 
7/12/15 “Bifurcated Amended Petition for STR DNA Testing, and Successive 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.”10)  In a written response, the state argued 
that the motion should be denied because it was essentially identical in all 
practical respects to Nelson’s originally-filed seventh successive petition. 
(R., pp.1220-1222.)  At a subsequent hearing, the district court denied Nelson’s 
request for leave.  (8/20/15 Tr., p.85, L.6 – p.86, L.18.)   
                                                        
10 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Nelson’s motion to augment the appellate 
record with the proposed “bifurcated” amended petition.  (12/13/16 Order.) 
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 At a previous hearing, prior to the filing of his amended petition and motion 
for leave, Nelson argued that, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(a), he was not required to 
obtain leave to file the amended petition because the state had not yet filed a 
responsive pleading.  (6/25/15 Tr., p.44, L.6 – p.45, L.2.)  The district court 
rejected this argument and stated that it construed the “State’s Response to 
Successive Petition,” which include a motion for summary dismissal of Nelson’s 
post-conviction petition, as a responsive pleading.  (6/25/15 Tr., p.44, L.24 – 
p.45, L.2; 8/20/15 Tr., p.85, Ls.13-21.)  Nelson challenges this determination on 
appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.55-56.)   
 Nelson has not provided any argument or authority standing for the 
proposition that the district court lacked the authority to characterize the state’s 
“Response to Successive Petition” as a “responsive pleading.”  See State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal 
are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered.”).  While the state’s response contained a motion for summary 
dismissal, it also contained elements of a responsive pleading, or Answer.  See 
I.R.C.P. 8(b) (setting forth the requirements for a responsive pleading).  In its 
response, the state admitted certain facts alleged in Nelson’s post-conviction 
petition, such as that Nelson was serving two fixed life sentences based on 
convictions for lewd conduct and kidnapping.  (R., p.1032.)  The state expressly 
“denie[d] every other claim upon which the petitioner relies in support of this 
petition.”  (R., p.1033.)  Additionally, as required by I.R.C.P. 8(b), the state “fairly 
responded to the substance” of Nelson’s post-conviction petition, in that it argued 
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that both of Nelson’s claims failed on their merits.  (R., pp.1032-1041.)  Further, 
several weeks before it filed its “Response,” the state filed a “Motion to Enlarge 
Time For State to File Answer.”  (R., pp.992-993.)  In light of these elements, 
Nelson cannot demonstrate that the district court erred by choosing to construe 
the state’s “Response to Successive Petition” as a “responsive pleading.”   
 However, even to the extent that the district court erred, any such error 
was harmless.  See I.R.C.P. 61 (“[a]t every stage of the proceeding, the court 
must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial 
rights”).  It is clear from a review of the record that Nelson’s “bifurcated” amended 
petition would not have successfully addressed the issues that ultimately led to 
the summary dismissal of Nelson’s post-conviction claims.  
2. Motion For Leave To Amend 
 In December 2015, approximately one week before the hearing on the 
state’s motion for summary dismissal, Nelson filed a motion for leave to amend 
his post-conviction petition and a proposed amended petition.  (R., pp.1381-
1423.)   At the subsequent hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, 
Nelson explained that the amended petition pertained to “a potentiality of 
secondary contamination at the FBI lab in 1994.”  (12/17/15 Tr., p.109, Ls.7-25.)     
(12/17/15 Tr., p.109, Ls.7-25.)  At that hearing, Nelson referenced a July 2015 
affidavit from forensic scientist George Schiro, Jr., in which Schiro asserted, 
among other things, that “Mr. Nelson’s DNA could have been indirectly 
transferred from skin cells on the exterior of the baby oil bottle to the anal and 
vaginal swabs during the FBI’s mineral oil analysis.”   (See R., p.1234.) 
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On appeal, Nelson contends that the district court erred in failing to rule on 
this motion prior to summarily dismissing the post-conviction petition.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.55.)  However, as discussed above with respect to Nelson’s 
motion for leave to conduct discovery, Nelson’s argument fails because the 
district court’s subsequent order granting the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal of Nelson’s post-conviction petition constituted an implicit denial of 
Nelson’s motion for leave to file an amended petition.  See Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 
61-62, 343 P.3d at 503-504.   
As with Nelson’s motion for leave to conduct discovery, the district court’s 
implicit denial of this motion is especially apparent considering the motion was 
specifically referenced by the court both in its dismissal order (R., p.1469), and 
during the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal (12/17/15 Tr., 
p.105, L.25 – p.107, L.8).  Therefore, Nelson has failed to demonstrate that the 
district court erred in failing to rule on this request.11 
Further, to the extent this Court construes this claim as also contending 
that the district court erred in implicitly denying the motion for leave file an 
amended post-conviction petition, the state asserts that Nelson has failed to 
                                                        
11 In the alternative, as discussed above with respect to Nelson’s motion for leave 
to conduct discovery, it does not appear that Nelson filed a notice of hearing with 
respect to this request.  “Under the local rules of the Fourth Judicial District, 
parties are required to schedule motion hearings with the clerk of the presiding 
judge and ‘only those civil matters which have been scheduled for hearing by the 
clerks as provided by this rule and noticed for hearing pursuant to Rules 5(a) and 
7(b), I.R.C.P., will be heard by the court.’”  Bettwieser, 154 Idaho at 327, 297 P.3d 




demonstrate an abuse of discretion in light of the late nature of the motion for 
leave and the lack of evidentiary support for the request.  
 
IV. 
Nelson Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Denying Nelson’s Motions For Appointment Of Counsel 
 
A. Introduction   
Nelson contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motions for the appointment of counsel.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.56-59.)  A review 
of the record reveals that there was no possibility that Nelson’s claims could be 
developed into viable claims even with the assistance of counsel, and that the 
court therefore acted within its discretion to deny the motions.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to 
represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Plant v. 
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 
C. Counsel Was Properly Denied Because Nelson’s Claims Are Frivolous 
 
 Idaho Code § 19-4901(4) permits a post-conviction petitioner to seek relief 
on the grounds that “there exists evidence of material facts, not previously 
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the 
interest of justice.” 
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies 
financially and “alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a 
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reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to 
conduct a further investigation into the claim.”  Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
655, 152 P.3d 12, 16 (2007); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 
102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004); I.C. § 19-4904.  If the claims are so patently frivolous 
that there appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim 
even with the assistance of counsel, however, the court may deny the motion for 
counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-
conviction petitions.  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 
(2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004).  
“Some claims are so patently frivolous that they could not be developed into 
viable claims even with the assistance of counsel.”  Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 
168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).  Application of this standard to 
Nelson’s claims shows no error by the trial court. 
Nelson made his first motion for appointment of counsel in April 2015, 
approximately two months after he filed his seventh post-conviction petition. 
(R., pp.1042-1044.)  He filed a second motion for appointment of counsel12 in 
December 2015, approximately one week after the hearing on the state’s motion 
for summary dismissal.  (R., pp.1443-1452.)   
The district court denied both motions after citing the applicable law and 
recognizing its discretionary authority.  (R., pp.1130-1132, 1469-1470.)  While the 
rationale relied upon by the district court was similar to that it utilized to ultimately 
                                                        
12 The clerk’s record on appeal also includes a motion for appointment of counsel 
filed by Nelson in June 2015.  (R., pp.1190-1193.)   However, this motion 
contains a case number that is not associated with Nelson’s seventh post-
conviction petition.  
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dismiss Nelson’s post-conviction petition, the court also expressly analyzed 
Nelson’s motions “under the lower standard of appointment of counsel rather 
than the standards for summary dismissal.”  (R., pp.1131, 1470.)    
For all of the reasons set forth by the district court, as well as all of the 
arguments made above with respect to the district court’s summary dismissal of 
Nelson’s seventh post-conviction petition, the state asserts that Nelson failed to 
allege facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid claim.  Nelson therefore has 
also failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in denying 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
orders denying Nelson’s seventh petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 8th day of March, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Mark W. Olson_______ 
      MARK W. OLSON 
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